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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3121 
_____________ 
  
MECCA & SONS TRUCKING CORP. 
 
v. 
  
WHITE ARROW, LLC; ABC CORPORATIONS 1-5, 
(said names being fictitious); JOH DOES 1-6, 
(said names being fictitious); 
TRADER JOE’S COMPANY, INC. 
 
White Arrow, LLC, 
 
              Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-07915) 
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, VANASKIE* and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  March 25, 2019) 
 
 
                                              
* The Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie retired from the Court on January 1, 2019 
after the argument and conference in this case, but before the filing of the opinion.  This 
opinion is filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) and Third Circuit 
I.O.P. Chapter 12. 
2 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION** 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Before us is a dispute over a rejected shipment of cheese. Trader Joe’s, a national 
grocery chain, rejected a shipment of its private-label cheese based on high temperature 
readings during transit. The cheese was then destroyed due to safety concerns. The 
parties now dispute which should ultimately bear the cost of this loss. Because we agree 
with the District Court’s judgment in this case, we will affirm.  
I 
 As we write principally for the parties, we recite only the facts necessary for our 
discussion. Trader Joe’s ordered a shipment of its private-label cheese from dairy 
manufacturer Singletons Dairy. This shipment was governed by a Master Vendor 
Agreement between the two parties, which required refrigerated products to “be shipped 
and received at 40°F or less” and to be monitored by a temperature monitoring device 
during transit. J.A. 384. Singletons retained Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. to handle the 
shipment. Mecca, in turn, retained White Arrow to carry the shipment from Bayonne, 
New Jersey, to Fontana, California, with the email instruction that it be “chilled 40 
degrees.” J.A. 491.  
The shipment, comprising seventeen pallets of cheese, was loaded into the 
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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refrigerated truck, or “reefer,” in good condition. However, when it arrived in Fontana, 
the temperature monitoring devices on some pallets evidenced reefer temperatures above 
forty degrees for prolonged periods during transit, including some readings above sixty 
degrees. Based on these readings, Trader Joe’s representatives rejected part of the 
shipment “due to warm temp.” J.A. 351, 353, 355. Mecca arranged for the rejected 
cheese to be transported to a cold storage facility, where it was tested by White Arrow’s 
expert and eventually destroyed. Mecca then paid Singletons damages in the amount of 
$73,581.16, the value of the lost shipment. Mecca now seeks from White Arrow that 
amount plus $7,600.00 in additional costs under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 
14706. White Arrow denies Mecca’s claim and maintains a cross-claim against Trader 
Joe’s for wrongful rejection of cheese. 
After a series of procedural back-and-forths, the District Court ultimately granted 
summary judgment in favor of Trader Joe’s on White Arrow’s wrongful rejection claim; 
granted summary judgment in favor of Mecca on its Carmack Amendment claim and 
damages; and granted summary judgment in favor of White Arrow on Mecca’s claims of 
negligence and indemnification as preempted by the Carmack Amendment. White Arrow 
now appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mecca and 
Trader Joe’s. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment. DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879 F.3d 71, 75 (3d 
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Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
III 
A. Mecca’s Standing to Bring a Carmack Amendment Claim 
As a threshold matter, we first address White Arrow’s argument that Mecca, a 
broker, lacks standing to recover its losses under the Carmack Amendment. While White 
Arrow is correct in noting that the Carmack Amendment does not grant brokers a right to 
sue, Mecca may still avail itself of the provision granting a right of action to a “person 
entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading.” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1).  White 
Arrow has failed to demonstrate that Mecca is not a person entitled to recover its losses 
under this provision. 1  Further, as the District Court noted, Mecca’s claim reasonably 
could be considered under a theory of equitable subrogation or as an action for 
apportionment under 49 U.S.C. § 14706(b), and White Arrow has made no attempt to 
rebut either of these findings. Therefore, absent a persuasive argument to the contrary, we 
                                              
1 White Arrow relies heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Exel, Inc. v. 
Southern Refrigerated Transport, Inc., 807 F.3d 140 (6th Cir. 2015), which rejected a 
broker’s attempt to recover losses from a carrier under the Carmack Amendment. 
However, that case is easily distinguished from the issue before us, as the broker in that 
case sought to recover two types of losses not represented here. First, the broker had not 
reimbursed the shipper for its losses; it was only attempting to recover from the carrier on 
the shipper’s behalf. Second, the broker was also seeking its own recovery for the 
carrier’s alleged violation of their separate transportation agreement. Mecca does not fit 
either of these scenarios—instead, it is standing in Singletons’ shoes after suffering 
Singletons’ loss.  
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determine that Mecca has standing to assert a claim under the Carmack Amendment.2 
B. Mecca’s Prima Facie Case 
We now turn to the question of whether Mecca was properly granted summary 
judgment against White Arrow on its Carmack Amendment claim. To recover under the 
Carmack Amendment, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by proving the 
following three elements: “(1) delivery of the goods to the initial carrier in good 
condition, (2) damage of the goods before delivery to their final destination, and (3) the 
amount of damages.” Paper Magic Grp., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 318 F.3d 458, 
461 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). The first element is not contested here. The 
second element—whether the goods were damaged before delivery—presents the critical 
question in this case.   
To establish the damaged condition of the goods upon delivery, a plaintiff must 
present direct or circumstantial evidence that is “sufficient to establish by a 
preponderance of all the evidence the condition of the goods upon delivery.” Beta Spawn, 
Inc. v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., 250 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citation 
omitted). Here, all parties agree that the rejected cheese pallets’ temperature recording 
devices reflected temperatures above forty degrees at multiple points during transit, in 
violation of Trader Joe’s vendor agreement with Singletons. Both Mecca and Trader 
                                              
2 White Arrow itself has previously conceded Mecca’s standing on this claim. 
During proceedings in the District Court, White Arrow successfully argued that Mecca’s 
state law claims for damages were “preempted by federal law which exclusively governs 
this matter involving transportation in interstate commerce.” J.A. 91. It cannot now argue 
that the same federal law is inapplicable to Mecca’s claims.  
6 
 
Joe’s argue that these temperature readings are direct and irrefutable evidence that the 
cheese was already damaged at delivery, allowing Trader Joe’s to reject the shipment. 
White Arrow disagrees, arguing that the pallet temperature readings alone do not 
demonstrate any damage to the cheese itself, and that Trader Joe’s was “required to 
conduct an immediate inspection of the goods to thoroughly document the nature and 
extent of damage.” White Arrow Br. 12. It further argues that “[n]o evidence was 
produced by Mecca or Trader Joe’s of any contamination and that the increased 
temperatures in transit rendered the cheese unsafe for human consumption by the public.” 
Id. at 15. However, White Arrow misses the critical point in Mecca’s claim, instead 
relying on cases that are distinguishable from the present circumstances.  
Our case law makes clear that carriers are “strictly liable for damages” under the 
Carmack Amendment, Certain Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds of London v. United 
Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 762 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 2014), up to “the actual loss or 
injury to the property caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the delivering carrier, or 
(C) [certain intermediary carriers].” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Although carriers and 
shippers can agree to limit the carrier’s liability in accordance with certain conditions, 49 
U.S.C. § 14706(c)(1)(A), no such limitations are at issue in this case. 
Here, Singletons—and, eventually, Mecca—suffered an actual loss of property 
when its cheese product was subject to conditions that violated the transportation 
requirements set out in its Master Vendor Agreement with Trader Joe’s and 
communicated to White Arrow via email. Whether experts could reasonably disagree as 
to the safety of the cheese, and whether Trader Joe’s could have kept the cheese under 
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observation for spoilage, is beside the point. Trader Joe’s had contracted to accept the 
shipment only if it had been “shipped and received at 40°F or less,” with the packaging 
clean and intact, free of dents or tears, and seals intact. 3  J.A. 384. For any party to show 
that the goods had been damaged before delivery, they needed only show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that one of Trader Joe’s requirements had been violated, 
as a violation would render the goods unsaleable. 4  That evidence is clearly present in 
this case.  
Mecca has also proven damages satisfactory to establish the third element of its 
claim. For the purpose of a Carmack Amendment claim, damages are ordinarily 
measured by “the difference between the market value of goods at the time of delivery, 
and the time when they should have been delivered.” Paper Magic, 318 F.3d at 461 
(internal citation omitted). The market value may be determined by the “invoice price,” 
id. at 462, or the “contract price,” Robert Burton Assocs., Inc. v. Preston Trucking Co., 
Inc., 149 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), less any recovered 
value from salvage or resale, Paper Magic, 318 F.3d at 461. Here, the damages 
                                              
3 These requirements speak to “the gravity of the duty for a retailer like Trader 
Joe’s to assure the safety of food that it sells to consumers,” as the District Court aptly 
described. Mecca & Sons Trucking Corp. v. White Arrow, LLC, No. 14-7915, 2016 WL 
5859018, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 16, 2016). 
 
4 White Arrow’s argument that the majority of temperature readings were near 
forty degrees is unavailing. For Trader Joe’s to accept the cheese shipment as 
undamaged, it had to “be shipped and received at 40°F or less.” J.A. 384. White Arrow’s 
second argument, that it followed its instruction to keep the shipment “chilled 40 
degrees,” J.A. 491, by setting the reefer to forty degrees, is also without merit. The fact 
remains that multiple pallets of cheese were not maintained at the required temperature. 
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determination for the shipment itself is simple and well supported. Mecca paid Singletons 
$73,581.16, the invoice price of the damaged cheese as reflected in the bills of lading. It 
now seeks that same amount in damages from White Arrow. Given that the cheese was 
destroyed, no salvage value remains, leaving $73,581.16 as the proper amount of 
damages for the lost shipment. 
Mecca also seeks to recover the cost of transporting, storing, and destroying the 
rejected cheese, at a total of $7,600.00.  While this claim goes beyond the market value of 
the shipment, “the Supreme Court has recognized that the test of market value is at best 
but a convenient means of getting at the loss suffered” and that “other more accurate 
means” may be used. Robert Burton, 149 F.3d at 221. Indeed, in our discussion regarding 
the Carmack Amendment’s preemptive power, we noted that its scope is “broad enough 
to embrace ‘all losses resulting from any failure to discharge a carrier’s duty as to any 
part of the agreed transportation,’” Lloyds of London, 762 F.3d at 335 (quoting Ga., Fla. 
& Ala. Ry. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196 (1916)), so long as they are 
“foreseeable to a reasonable [person],” Paper Magic, 318 F.3d at 461. Further, special 
damages may be allowed when a plaintiff “actually notified the carrier that the goods 
required special handling of some kind, thereby giving the carrier notice and making the 
damages foreseeable.” Id. at 462. Here, we agree with the District Court that Mecca need 
not pursue recovery of its additional costs under the category of special damages, as the 
costs associated with the handling of the rejected cheese were foreseeable by a reasonable 
person. As to proof, Mecca has provided adequate evidence of its costs, and White Arrow 
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has not challenged its calculations.5 Therefore, Mecca has succeeded in establishing all 
three elements of its prima facie case. 
Once a plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the 
carrier to prove that it was free from negligence and that the damage was caused solely 
by (a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public 
authority; (e) or the inherent vice or nature of the goods.” Beta Spawn, 250 F.3d at 223 
(internal citation omitted).White Arrow has not presented persuasive evidence in support 
of any of these defenses and has therefore failed to meet its burden. Thus, we can only 
conclude that White Arrow is liable to Mecca under the Carmack Amendment for the 
losses incurred by the rejected cheese. 
C. Trader Joe’s Rejection of the Cheese 
To the extent that we have not already addressed White Arrow’s wrongful 
rejection claim against Trader Joe’s in our discussion above, we now state plainly that 
this claim is without merit. Trader Joe’s only obligations in relation to the cheese were 
determined by the Master Vendor Agreement between it and Singletons. It had no 
separate contractual relationship with White Arrow, and White Arrow was not a third-
party beneficiary of the Master Vendor Agreement. Even assuming, arguendo, that one 
could identify a contractual obligation between the two parties, the temperature 
requirement remained in place at all times. Therefore, Trader Joe’s was still within its 
                                              
5 White Arrow emphatically challenges the timeliness of Mecca’s evidence 
submissions. However, the District Court’s determination on this issue was well-reasoned 
and we see no grounds on which to disturb it. 
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rights to reject any portion of the shipment that had not been chilled at forty degrees.  
Thus, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of 
Trader Joe’s on White Arrow’s cross-claim. 
IV 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of District Court. 
